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In the aftermath of 11 September, scholarly treatments of terrorism and
how to combat it have increased dramatically and become far more relevant.
With the United States military in full war mode, backed up by Great Britain and
perhaps Canada, it is of special interest to understand how allies cooperate to
combat the threat of terrorism in all its myriad forms. While the operations
against the El Qaeda network in Afghanistan were on a large scale, as evidenced
by OPERATIONS ANACONDA and APOLLO, J. Paul de B. Taillon, an Adjunct
Professor for War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston,
Ontario, examines lower-level British and American counter-terrorism opera-
tions of the recent past.
The author explores the history of British and American special forces
from their origins in World War II as the British Special Operations Executive
(SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to the modern, elite
British Army’s Special Air Service (SAS) and the United States Army’s Delta
Force. After establishing this historical foundation, Taillon proceeds to explain
the reasons why certain counter-terrorism operations have succeeded, and has
settled on the thesis that international cooperation is essential. Unfortunately,
there are some doubts about his methodology and conclusions.
In the first instance, Taillon suggests that governments may not consider
the modern terrorist threat “so serious that they would risk open cooperation with
regimes with which they feel they have little in common.” (p. xii)  Clearly, since
11 September the United States is prepared to cooperate with anyone that will
lend assistance in the “war on terrorism.” What, may one ask, has the United
States in common with Pakistan? Taillon is on even less solid ground when he
suggests that inflicting heavy cost on terrorist organizations in operations of the
very recent past “provided the opportunity for deterring future attacks.” (p. xiii)
Ironically, he cites the 1998 bombing of Osama Bin Laden’s camps in
Afghanistan as proof of this assertion. Obviously, this statement is inconsistent
with 11 September and Taillon at least later acknowledges that striking back
might not have the intended deterrent effect.
The major problem with the book, however, is to be found in his choice of
case studies, so chosen to underpin his thesis. His first case study is the 1980
Iranian embassy siege in London, summarily dealt with by the elite 22nd SAS
Regiment from Hereford. After a few days of preparation the SAS stormed the
building, killed five of the six terrorists and secured the hostages in 11 minutes.
Yet Taillon’s example of international cooperation in this instance is British
access to No. 17 Princess Gate belonging to the Ethiopian Embassy situated
directly beside the Iranian Embassy. In fact, it seems a poor example of interna-
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tional cooperation, the absence of which would not have mattered. OPERATION
NIMROD, as the SAS mission was designated, was a British operation with a
lone German GSG9 observer. Indeed, Taillon freely admits that “As this was a
‘home’ operation, the requirements for international cooperation to assist the
Special Air Service … appear to have been minimal.” (p. 50)
Taillon’s second case study, OPERATION EAGLE CLAW, Delta’s attempt
to free the Iranian hostages in 1980, appears to been an even more inappropriate
choice. International cooperation was indeed more visible in this operation.
Egypt allowed the US to use an airfield at Qena and Oman permitted them to use
an off-shore island. The British made available Diego Garcia for equipment
modification and Turkey may have allowed an AWACS to operate in Turkish air-
space. There is some indication that Colonel Charlie Beckwith’s Delta team had
trained with GSG9 and had been advised by the SAS and the French GIGN. The
GSG9 even offered a team to go in. The Canadian ambassador to Iran, Ken
Taylor, also played a role by providing intelligence to the Americans and two for-
mer Iranian generals acted as informers. There was also the possibility that Israel
lent assistance in some fashion. 
Indeed, Taillon assembles much better evidence to support the methodolo-
gy of international cooperation in this second case study, but his evidence does
not enhance his argument that such cooperation is essential for success because
of the simple fact that EAGLE CLAW ended in dismal failure in the Dasht-e-
Kavir desert. Had it been a success his thesis would have been stronger.  Thus,
in one case study, there is no evidence to substantiate the claim that internation-
al cooperation helped in the successful NIMROD operation and in the other the
author gathers more evidence of international cooperation in a losing effort. This
basic weakness of logic renders the work incongruous. Indeed, looking only a lit-
tle farther afield, one can bring forth the highly successful 1976 unilateral Israeli
hostage rescue at the Entebbe airfield in Uganda as powerful evidence that inter-
national cooperation is not a necessary adjunct to success.
In conclusion, the best part of the book is the evolutionary history of
British and American special forces. Even if the essence of Taillon’s work, that
international cooperation is necessary for successful counter-terrorism actions, is
basically sound, Taillon fails to prove his argument that international cooperation
is essential in such low-level counter-terrorism operations such as hostage res-
cues.
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